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This Article analyzes the proportionality standard in discovery.
Proponents of this standard believe it has the potential to infuse
discovery practice with considerably more attention to questions
related to the costs and benefits of discovery. The 1983
Amendments introduced proportionality into Rule 26, setting forth
a cost-benefit standard designed to:
address the problem of discovery that is
disproportionate to the individual lawsuit as measured
by such matters as its nature and complexity, the
importance of the issues at stake in a case seeking
damages, the limitations on a financially weak litigant
to withstand extensive opposition to a discovery
program or to respond to discovery requests, and the
significance of the substantive issues, as measured in
philosophic, social, or institutional terms. Thus the
rule recognizes that many cases in public policy
spheres, such as employment practices, free speech,
and other matters, may have importance far beyond
the monetary amount involved. The court must apply
the standards in an even-handed manner that will
prevent use of discovery to wage a war of attrition or
as a device to coerce a party, whether financially weak
or affluent.1
1 The proportionality standard entered the Rules in 1983 as part of Rule 26(b)(1)(ii). See
FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee notes (effective 1983) (describing the function of the
proportionality standard). Proportionality also appeared in Rule 26(g)(1); this subparagraph's
present language states that by signing a discovery request,
an attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry... (B) ... a
discovery request, response, or objection .... is... (oii) neither unreasonable
nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior
discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the
issues at stake in the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1).
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A frequently expressed perception is that judges have been
hesitant to apply the proportionality standard on a regular basis.
2
Amendments to the rules in 1993 and 2000 aimed at promoting
the responsible use of the proportionality standard failed to
produce tangible results.3 These amendments, which focused on
organizational changes to the rules, were motivated by the
assumption that sparse use of the proportionality rule resulted, in
part, from the courts' and litigants' lack of knowledge regarding
the Rules' applicability to their case.4 The 2015 Amendments
continue this trend by proposing further organizational changes to
the rules.
5
This Article assumes that the organizational changes contained
in the 2015 Amendments will deliver litigants and judges who are
fully informed about the proportionality standard's existence and
applicability. Thus we focus on the issues that judges and
litigants will face as they attempt to apply the proportionality
standard in practice. In particular, we focus on the potentially
difficult questions and the related measurement issues that must
2 See, e.g., Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell to Judge Jeffrey Sutton, at B-8
(June 14, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/ffile/18218/download (stating both that "three
previous Civil Rules Committees in three different decades have reached the same
conclusion as the current Committee - that proportionality is an important and necessary
feature of civil litigation in federal courts" and that "proportionality is still lacking in too
many cases," such that "[t]he previous amendments have not had their desired effect"). For
academic commentary to the same effect, see Ronald J. Hedges, A View from the Bench and
the Trenches: A Critical Appraisal of Some Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 227 F.R.D. 123 (2005) (noting that the proportionality rule was not being
used by judges); Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil
Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 349-70 (2000) (noting that
proportionality standards are "seldom-used" and "something of a dud"); Richard L. Marcus,
Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 773-74 (1998) [hereinafter Marcus,
Discovery Containment Redux] (noting that the proportionality amendment "seems to have
created only a ripple in the caselaw"); Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for
the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 163
(1999) (noting non-use of proportionality provisions).
3 See Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, supra note 2, at 764 (discussing the 1993
Amendment); Hedges, supra note 2, at 125-26 (discussing the 2000 Amendment).
4 See Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, supra note 2, at 764 (discussing the 1993
Amendment); Hedges, supra note 2, at 125-26 (discussing the 2000 Amendment).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (effective Dec. 1, 2015).
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be overcome in order to carry out the proportionality standard's
cost-benefit test with any precision.
While some of these questions may often be resolved by
evidence that is relatively straightforward to acquire and measure,
others frequently will not. For example, in some cases measuring
the costs of a discovery request against the amount in controversy
may be a relatively straightforward calculation. However, the
implications for limiting a discovery request based on a particular
ratio of costs to stakes are less straightforward. Such an inquiry
will require judges to weigh costs and benefits to both parties and
to society as a whole. This latter task will often require a more
difficult accounting of less quantifiable questions such as "the
importance of the issues at stake in the action" when attempting
to ascertain "whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit."
6
Courts considering proportionality issues in individual cases
will have to grapple with three key economic facts about the U.S.
discovery system: (1) the cost externalization that occurs because a
party's discovery requests impose economic burdens on the
responder; (2) the agency problems that arise when the responder
has superior information about either (a) its own cost of discovery
production or (b) how the production would alter the strategic
position of each party to the litigation; and (3) the divergence
between social and private benefits of discovery, e.g., in litigation
with important precedential or social value that will not be
internalized by the litigants. The rest of this Article considers how
these facts shape the decisions facing judges who, if the future
matches the Advisory Committee's aspirations, will now manage
proportionality assessments.
6 FED. R. CiV. P. 26(b)(1) (effective Dec. 1, 2015).
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II. THE 2015 AMENDMENTS AND A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
PROPORTIONALITY STANDARD IN THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
The 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
seek to promote the responsible use of the proportionality standard
by courts and litigants by incorporating the standard's cost-benefit
analysis into the general scope of discovery.7 Specifically, the 2015
Amendments move the language containing the proportionality
standard from Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (limits on discovery) to a more
prominent place in Rule 26(b)(1).8 Amended Rule 26(b)(1) reads:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by
court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties
may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense
and proportional to the needs of the case, considering
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the
amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to
relevant information, the parties' resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and
whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information
within this scope of discovery need not be admissible to
be evidence to be discoverable.9
In moving the proportionality standard back to its original
home in Rule 26(b)(1), the 2015 Amendments continue the
Advisory Committee's focus on amendment by reorganization. 10
7 Id.
8 Compare id., with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (effective Dec. 1, 2015).
9 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (effective Dec. 1, 2015) (emphasis added).
10 Id. The Committee's chair relates that it used organization in self-consciously
substantive ways: its Chair stated that
the Committee ... reversed the order of the initial proportionality factors to
refer first to "the importance of the issues at stake" and second to "the
amount in controversy." This rearrangement adds prominence to the
importance of the issues and avoids any implication that the amount in
controversy is the most important concern.
10972016]
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The proportionality provisions were moved from Rule 26(b)(1) to
their pre-2015 Amendment location in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) as part
of the 1993 amendments.11 Rule 26(b)(2) was added to highlight
the flexibility that courts possessed when addressing high-volume
and high-cost discovery. In particular, the rule required that:
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the
frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by
these rules or by local rule if it determines
that: ... (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties' resources, the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, and the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues. 
12
Based on a perception that the organizational changes
contained in the 1993 amendment did not result in the
proportionality standard being implemented "with the vigor that
was contemplated," more organizational changes to the rules were
made as part of the 2000 Amendments.13  The committee
suspected that the location of the proportionality standard, "buried
among other discovery provisions, hindered its effectiveness."14 In
an attempt to draw greater attention to the standard, the 2000
Amendments added a "redundant" cross-reference to the
limitations in Rule 26(b)(2) to the end of Rule 26(b)(1).15
The 2015 Amendments reflect the assumption that the
organizational changes contained in the 2000 Amendments, like
the ones contained in the 1993 Amendments, did not adequately
promote the responsible use of the proportionality standard. The
Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell, supra note 2, at B-8.
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's note, 1993 Amendments.
12 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (amended 1993) (emphasis added).
13 FED. R. CIv. P. 26, advisory committee's notes, 2000 Amendments.
14 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON
PROPORTIONALITY IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 3 (Jan. 2013).
15 FED. R. CIV. P 26(b)(1). The last sentence, added in 2000, reads: "All discovery is
subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C)."
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focus on organizational changes in the 2015 Amendments suggests
the committee continues to assume that the apparent shortfall in
judges' and parties' use of the proportionality standard results
partly from a lack of awareness of the proportionality standards'
applicability to their case. As noted above, we will assume that
the 2015 Amendments will create that awareness.
III. WHY PRIVATE AND SOCIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF LITIGATION
CAN DIVERGE
Economic actors who are adept at pursuing their own self-
interest, at least as these actors themselves perceive those
interests, will make choices so that the private marginal costs and
private marginal benefits of those actions are equal.16  For
example, if apples cost a dollar, and a person buys exactly one
apple, then that person must have regarded that apple as worth at
least a dollar while regarding a second apple as worth less than a
dollar. When economic actors bear all the costs of their actions, or
are able to collect all the benefits, economists say that costs or
benefits are fully internalized. When a person buys one apple at a
price of a dollar, she bears all the ordinarily relevant consequences
of this action. As a matter of social policy, we are usually
comfortable allowing her both to buy that apple and to not buy an
additional one. 17
Sometimes, though, some costs are borne by those other than
the actors themselves, or some benefits are received by others.
Economists say that such costs or benefits are externalized when
no regulatory or market mechanism functions to ensure that the
parties take such costs and benefits into account.'8 When there
are uninternalized costs, the private costs facing individual
economic actors will be lower than the social costs resulting from
16 Here, "marginal costs" refers to the added cost of the last unit of action, while
"marginal benefits" refers to the added benefit of that unit.
17 Of course, if there were a communicable infectious disease on the apple, we would feel
differently; the "ordinarily relevant consequences" phrase does some work here.
'8 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 42 (1960)
(demonstrating that, in the absence of transaction costs, the full costs and benefits of an
action or activity will be internalized by contracting parties).
20161 1099
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their actions. Conversely, uninternalized benefits cause the
private benefits individual economic actors realize to exceed the
benefits society overall receives from these actions. For example,
pollution caused by factory operations may harm people other than
the factory owners without creating any legal duty of
compensation. Furthermore, the harms may be diffuse, so that the
costs of using market mechanisms to mitigate these harms are
prohibitive.19 Suppose that the benefits of the factory owner's
actions are fully internalized, so that the private and social
benefits are the same. Then the existence of uninternalized
pollution costs means that, absent environmental regulations of
one sort or another, our factory owner will find it privately
worthwhile to pollute too much: the social costs of the pollution he
emits will exceed the private (and thus the social) benefits.
In this Part of the Article, we point out that litigation in general
involves both externalized costs and externalized benefits; we
discuss discovery in particular in the next Part.20  Analyses
comparing the private and social incentives to use the legal system
demonstrate how these incentives can diverge with respect to both
the costs and the benefits of the legal system. As a result, the
privately determined level of litigation can be either socially
excessive or socially inadequate.
21
On the cost side, the private and social costs of litigation
diverge because litigation costs are not fully internalized.22 For
19 See Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 27
(1972) (identifying settings where prohibitively high transaction costs can prevent the full
internalization of certain types of harms).
20 Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 584 (1997) [hereinafter Shavell, The
Fundamental Divergence]. See also Steven Shavell, The Social versus the Private Incentive
to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 334 (1982) (comparing the
private costs and benefits to the social costs and benefits of litigation); Louis Kaplow,
Private versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 371 (1986); Peter S.
Menell, A Note on Private versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly Legal System, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 41, 44 (1983); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Mark Geistfeld, The Divergence
between the Social and Private Incentives to Sue: A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and
Kaplow, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 483, 483 (1987).
21 Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence, supra note 20, at 577-78.
22 For a discussion of market mechanisms and the viability of Coasian bargaining in the
context of reducing cost externalization in legal discovery, see Jonah B. Gelbach,
[Vol. 50:10931100
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example, except when a court would refuse to enter a default
judgment, the mere act of a plaintiffs filing a complaint will
always impose some costs on a defendant. On the defendant's
side, filing, say, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion forces the plaintiff to argue
against the motion and might force the plaintiff to investigate and
collect evidence she did not have at the time she filed her
complaint. Analogizing the litigation process to economic behavior
generally suggests that one effect of the partial externalization of
litigation costs is to generate litigation activity whose aggregate
social costs exceed its aggregate social benefits.
However, this tendency to overuse the legal system may be
offset by differences between the private and social benefits of
litigation. A tort victim seeking money damages does not collect
all the social benefits that accrue to society from the effect a
judgment will have on deterrence, incentives to take care, the
benefits of precedent, or other social benefits that would be
generated through litigation.23 Over the years, Congress has
created many private rights of action that function to deter
unlawful activity such as discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
or religion.24 Via statute, Congress has provided procedural
features such as damage multipliers and fee-shifting, which
encourage litigation of statutorily created causes of action.25 These
procedural choices can be rationalized within the present
Discovering Coase, Technical Report, U. Pa. Law School (2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2713897; Jonah B. Gelbach, Can Simple Mechanism Design Results
be Used to Implement the Proportionality Standard in Discovery?, 172 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 200 (2016). See also Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, When
Do Rules of Procedure Matter?, 46 J. POL. 206, 206 (1984) (applying Coasian analysis to the
design of procedural rules); J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of
Civil Settlement, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2016); and J.J. Prescott, Kathryn E. Spier & Albert
Yoon, Trial and Settlement: A Study ofHigh-Low Agreements, 57 J.L. & ECON. 699 (2014).
23 See, e.g., Chris W. Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1227, 1264-65 (2001) (examining how evidentiary rules on the admissibility of
character evidence affect the incentives to engage in criminal activity); Kathryn E. Spier, A
Note on the Divergence Between the Private and Social Motive to Settle Under a Negligence
Rule, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 613, 613 (1997) (discussing the effects on victim's incentives to
bring private suits on public deterrence).
24 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2012) (creating a cause of action for victims of sex
discrimination).
25 Id. (allowing fee-shifting).
2016] 1101
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discussion as springing from a view that certain favored types of
litigation bring substantial social benefits that are external to the
litigants themselves.
26
On the other hand, the private benefits from using the litigation
system may also exceed the social benefits. This will happen when
litigation primarily divides stakes, a situation that economists
sometimes describe as "rent dissipation." Interpleader actions are
a classic example featuring this litigation dynamic, as multiple
parties fight over a fixed pool of resources. Debt-collection actions
against an insolvent party constitute another such example; the
risk and costs of the race to the courthouse in such actions are one
important reason why our bankruptcy system features the
automatic stay. The key point for our purposes is that rent
dissipation actions involve lower social than private benefits
because these actions produce little or no socially valuable
incentives such as deterrence of malfeasance or incentives to take
care.2
7
This discussion shows that both the costs and the benefits of
litigation can be partly external to those making litigation
decisions. Since external social costs are associated with too much
litigation, while external social benefits are associated with too
little, there are gross effects operating in both directions. As a
matter of simple arithmetic, then, the net impact of these gross
effects might point in either direction. Thus, whether there is too
much, too little, or just the right amount of litigation in general is
not a conclusion that can be drawn on a priori grounds. We turn
next to a discussion of issues specifically connected to discovery.
2 For a wide ranging discussion of procedural and legislative issues related to private
enforcement, see SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2010); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal
Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559,
1560 (2015).
27 See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 307, 337 (1994) (arguing that accuracy is only beneficial in certain situations).
[Vol. 50:10931102
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IV. COST AND BENEFIT EXTERNALIZATION IN DISCOVERY
Applying the logic of the previous Part yields two observations
concerning the American discovery system. First, since discovery
requests impose costs borne by the responder, some of our
discovery system's costs are externalized. In some cases, this
effect may predominate. When and where it does, limitations on
discovery-as-of-right, such as the proportionality standard, might
be worth imposing. Second, though, it is important to remember
that in some cases, discovery will create social benefits by inducing
revelation of evidence that yields socially beneficial litigation
outcomes.
A. EXTERNALIZATION OF DISCOVERY COSTS
Some authors have argued that the cost externalization effect
discussed above is magnified in discovery.28 Discovery allows one
party to externalize a large share of the responsibility and costs of
his discovery request to his adversary.29 Under current discovery
practice, the party responding to a discovery request is expected to
engage in a search to identify non-privileged documents and
information in its possession that is responsive to the request and
to produce them for inspection by the requesting party.30 The costs
fall where they lie, so that the party that receives the discovery
request bears the costs of responding to the discovery request.31
The responding party's production costs might be many times the
requesting party's modest costs of formulating the request and
28 Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation
and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 773 (2011); Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Law's Information Revolution as Procedural Reform: Predictive Search as a
Solution to the In Terrorem Effect of Externalized Discovery Costs, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
1473, 1476.
29 Redish & McNamara, supra note 28, at 779 (distinguishing between costs of discovery
and other litigation costs).
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
31 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (noting that the




reviewing the produced information.32  Parties' incentives to
request expansive discovery are limited only by the costs of
processing the material the responder produces. Consequently,
parties have incentives to make requests whose private benefits-
their benefits to the requesting parties themselves-might exceed
the costs of complying with the requests.
33
Discovery involves a second source of misaligned incentives not
present for other litigation expenditures-the creation of cross-
party agency costs. Responding parties must sort out relevant
from irrelevant documents based on the requesting party's
discovery request.34 That gives them discretion whenever the
discovery request is at all vague or ambiguous when applied to a
given document (or other object of discovery).35 Under these
circumstances, the responding party's attorney is forced to make
substantive decisions about whether a document is covered by the
request. For all functional purposes, that is tantamount to asking
an attorney to decide whether a document is useful to her
adversary's case. This feature of our discovery system effectively
requires a responding party's attorney, under threat of court-
imposed sanctions, to act as his adversary's agent.
36
Requiring lawyers to provide such benefits to their adversaries
conflicts with the ethical duty lawyers otherwise owe to clients,
inverting the adversarial system's usual obligations.37 As a result,
32 Kobayashi, supra note 28, at 1476.
33 Id.
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.").
35 William W. Schwarzer, In Defense of 'Automatic Disclosure in Discovery," 27 GA_ L.
REV. 655, 661 (1993) (noting the similarities between a lawyer's duty to respond to
automatic disclosure under the 1993 amendments-to Rule 26 and lawyers' duty to respond
to "vague, catch-all" traditional discovery requests that are "routinely" observed in
litigation).
36 See Redish & McNamara, supra note 28, at 779 (noting that "the extent of a
[responding] party's discovery costs are determined not by the litigant himself but by the
scope and content of the request filed by his opponent, and none of those expenditures
benefits the producing party's own case"). Redish and McNamara would allocate the costs
of responding to a discovery request to the requesting party under the theory of quantum
meruit. Id. at 788-91.




one feature of our discovery system is cross-party agency costs,
whose misaligned incentives may be even stronger than those that
exist in the well-studied agency relationship between a lawyer and
his client.38 By limiting their effort in accurately sorting between
relevant and irrelevant documents, the responding party's lawyer
will produce fewer relevant documents and more irrelevant ones.
The result will be (i) an increase in the requesting party's cost of
discovery (since requesters must sift more); (ii) a reduction in the
requesting party's value of discovery (because of requesters' sifting
costs and because of limited production of relevant materials
where responders have discretion); and (iii) a reduction in the
responding party's costs. Thus, the discovery system's cross-party
agency problems promote "shirking" by responders, which harms
the requesting party by increasing its costs and reducing the value
to the requester of what is produced.9
B. EXTERNALIZATION OF DISCOVERYS BENEFITS
Uninternalized spillover effects are not limited to the cost side.
In many cases, the private benefits of discovery will diverge from
the social value of litigation. Discovery in aid of rent-dissipating
litigation has the opposite features-it involves litigation
[A] common law trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding.
Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its
functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary.
See also Griffin B. Bell, Chilton Davis Varner & Hugh Q. Gottschalk, Automatic Disclosure
in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 40-46 (1992) (noting that how the
automatic disclosure requirement to disclose information "relevant to the disputed facts
alleged with particularity in the pleadings," contained in the 1993 Amendments to F.R.C.P.
26, would undermine the adversary system).
8 See Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil
Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 BYU L. REV. 579, 582 (suggesting that lawyer-client
agency costs generated by hourly billing practices were a contributing cause of
overdiscovery). See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987); Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 503 (1996); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Aligning the Interests of
Lawyers and Clients, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 165 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules,
Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707 (1998).
39 Redish & McNamara, supra note 28, at 790 (noting the benefits to requesting parties
from responding parties' actions in discovery; these benefits are reduced by the actual
discovery system's cross-party agency costs).
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expenditures that serve only or primarily to divide a fixed pool.40
On the other side of the ledger, discovery often is necessary to
vindicate the private rights created by public law, e.g., through
anti-discrimination statutes such as Title VII. By increasing both
the cost of litigation and the probability of losing a judgment,
discovery disincentivizes primary behavior that causes both
traditional common law harms such as contract breach or tort
injury and contemporary public-law harms such as employment
discrimination. Further, by its nature, discovery often creates a
more fulsome record for the proper adjudication of cases with
important public law dimensions, increasing the quality not only of
judgments and remedies, but also of resulting precedents.
41
C. AN ILLUSTRATIVE NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We can illustrate the points discussed above using a simple
numerical example. Suppose a plaintiff sues a defendant for
$100,000 in tort injuries. Without extensive discovery, the
plaintiff believes the probability she will win judgment is .5 so that
the expected judgment is $50,000.42 With extensive discovery,
which costs the plaintiff nothing but costs the defendant $30,000,
the plaintiff's chance of winning rises from fifty percent to seventy-
five percent. This means extensive discovery increases the
plaintiffs expected judgment from $50,000 to $75,000, so that the
private value of the information to the plaintiff is $25,000. If the
discovery actually occurs under the usual responder-pays cost
allocation rule, this means that the defendant will have to spend
$30,000 to provide the plaintiff with an expected benefit of
$25,000.43 Thus, in this example, the marginal cost of extensive
discovery exceeds the marginal benefit to the plaintiff.
40 See supra Part III.
4, On this latter point, consider the fact that appellate courts typically remand for
proceedings that will further develop the record in a case.
42 For simplicity, we assume that the parties are both risk-neutral; nothing important
about the example turns on this assumption.
43 It is possible that the defendant will decide to settle to avoid this result. But if parties
always settled when one faced the threat of disproportionate discovery costs, there would be
no actual disproportionate discovery expenditures. The Advisory Committee is on record
suggesting that disproportionate discovery does actually occur. See, e.g., Memorandum
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A judge imposing a cost-sensitive rule such as that contained in
the Rule 26's proportionality standard might choose either to (i)
block such discovery based on the fact that the costs of discovery
exceed the value of the information to the plaintiff, or (ii) require
the plaintiff to bear the costs of the extensive discovery pursuant
to the explicit cost allocation rule in Rule 26(c)(1)(B).44 In the
latter case, a plaintiff interested in maximizing her expected
judgment net of litigation costs would not be willing to spend the
$30,000 in question, so these two judicial decisions would have the
same effect in our example.
This example shows that when a judge deploys Rule 26 as
contemplated in our hypothetical case, the use of extensive
discovery is averted. Consequently, the plaintiff loses $25,000 in
expected judgment value, while the defendant saves $30,000 in
discovery costs.45 Looking only at the private costs and benefits,
this might be the sort of efficient cost-reduction result that the
proportionality standard is meant to achieve: via judicial
management, the defendant is spared discovery expenditures that
cost more than the financial gain the plaintiff would realize from
the requested information.
But that conclusion may be overturned when we take into
account social considerations, rather than just those involving the
particular parties to the litigation in question. To illustrate,
suppose the defendant is more optimistic about her chances than
the plaintiff is; in particular, the defendant believes she has only a
ten percent chance of losing at trial-yielding a defendant's
from Judge David G. Campbell, supra note 2, at B-36 (citing the 1983 Committee Note for
the proposition that the purpose of proportionality rules in discovery "is to guard against
redundant or disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount
of discovery" (emphasis added)); id. at B-6 (stating that "[a]lmost half of the [surveyed
lawyers from the American College of Trial Lawyers] believed that discovery is abused in
almost every case, with responses being essentially the same for both plaintiff and defense
lawyers"). Thus, following the Committee's discussion, we assume that this case will not
settle due only to the threat of such expensive discovery.
44 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(B) (effective Dec. 1, 2015).
45 Note that the plaintiffs lost expected judgment value corresponds to an additional
benefit to the defendant, since the defendant is the one paying any damages the plaintiff




expected judgment amount of $10,000. Assume that without
extensive discovery, the defendant will bear $15,000 in litigation
costs. Then from the moment when the tort cause of action
materializes, the defendant who is protected by a
proportionality/cost-shifting rule will expect that such a case will
cost a total of $25,000 ($10,000 in expected judgment and $15,000
in litigation costs).
Assume that the defendant believes that with extensive
discovery, the plaintiffs chance of winning will be fifteen percent.
46
Then, a defendant facing extensive discovery will expect to bear a
total cost of $60,000 from litigation ($15,000 in expected judgment,
$30,000 in extensive discovery costs, and $15,000 in additional
litigation costs).
Now imagine the defendant is considering how much care to
take in its primary behavior. For example, the defendant might be
a construction company deciding how much to spend delineating
and sheltering an area of sidewalk near a construction site.
Suppose the defendant can take either a high or low amount of
care. With a high amount of care, there will be no injuries. With a
low amount of care, there will be an average of one injury during
the project's pendency. Taking a high amount of care costs
$40,000 more than taking a low amount of care.
We have seen that when the construction company does not
have to worry about extensive discovery, its expected costs related
to an injury will be $25,000. We have also seen that the company
could eliminate the injury risk at a cost of $40,000. A profit-
maximizing firm will not spend $40,000 to save $25,000. So
without the threat of extensive discovery costs, the construction
company will not take a high amount of care, and a person will be
injured. On the other hand, if it will have to pay for extensive
discovery when it is sued, the firm will expect that an injury will
cost it $60,000. A profit-maximizing firm will spend $40,000 to
save itself $60,000. Thus, the firm in this example will take care
46 Thus, the defendant believes that the extensive discovery will have relatively little




if, and only if, it would bear the cost of extensive discovery in the
event of litigation.
By assumption in our example, a plaintiffs injuries have a
monetary value of $100,000. The additional care necessary to
prevent this injury costs only $40,000. Thus, it is efficient for the
construction company to take the high level of care in order to
avert injury. Yet, a switch to a proportionality-based discovery
policy induces the company not to take this level of care: the
change in discovery policy causes an inefficient level of care. This
result occurs because the threat of future extensive discovery costs
induces the company-which, as a defendant, will be unduly
optimistic about its litigation chances-to take appropriate care.
This example is, of course, highly contrived. But it works well
to demonstrate how the aggregate social value of extensive
discovery can exceed the private value to a plaintiff in a litigation
process that has already commenced. Discovery's role in raising
the net cost of litigation creates the same basic dynamic n myriad
other settings besides the simple tort example just developed. For
example, the risk of expensive civil rights litigation serves to
encourage large employers to develop policies that prevent
discrimination against minorities, women, and other groups whom
Congress has chosen to protect. Discovery costs, no less than
legislated features such as one-way fee shifting, play a part in
these socially chosen incentives.
47
V. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE SIX PROPORTIONALITY
FACTORS
The observations in the previous Part underscore the practical
challenge facing judges. Judges will have to apply discovery limits
without limiting discovery in cases where the private and external
social benefits from discovery together are substantial enough to
warrant a responding party's expenditures. There is no magical
solution to this problem. Rather, it will require a case-by-case
analysis of numerous factors. In this Part, we synthesize our




earlier discussions of the proportionality standard contained in
Rule 26, on the one hand, and the economic analysis of discovery
costs, on the other.
The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2015 Amendment to Rule
26 emphasizes that proportionality is for both the parties and the
judge to effect: "The parties and the court have a collective
responsibility to consider the proportionality of all discovery and
consider it in resolving discovery disputes."8 In addition, the
Committee Note states that the 2015 amendment is not "intended
to permit the opposing party to refuse discovery simply by making
a boilerplate objection that it is not proportional."49  But
presumably the scope for parties to carry out their collective
responsibility will depend critically on how judges resolve those
disputes that do make their way into court. Likewise, whether
refusals become boilerplate or remain the exception to the rule will
depend on how litigated discovery disputes are resolved. Thus we
focus our discussion on discovery disputes that make it before a
judge.
Here it is helpful to recall the proportionality-related points of
Rule 26(b)(1)'s language. Discovery's scope is limited to whatever
is "proportional to the needs of the case," considering the following
enumerated factors:
1. the importance of the issues at stake in the action;
2. the amount in controversy;
3. the parties' relative access to relevant
information;
4. the parties' resources;
5. the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues, and
6. whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.50
48 FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's notes, 2015 Amendment; Memorandum from
Judge David G. Campbell, supra note 2, at B-39.
49 Id.
50 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (effective Dec. 1, 2015).
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We break our discussion of these factors into four sections.
Section A concerns factors 1 and 2 in the Rule's list--"importance"
factors that relate to the qualitative and quantitative magnitude of
the issues and the amount in controversy. Section B turns to
factors 3 and 4-"party access" issues that have to do with the
parties' ability to obtain information and party resources. Section
C considers factor 5, which we call the "forecasting" factor since it
requires judges to determine how important yet-to-be-provided
information would be in determining issues at stake. Finally,
Section D considers the "balancing" factor, factor 6, which will
require judges to conduct a cost-benefit analysis involving disputed
discovery requests.
Throughout, we will emphasize the extent to which each factor
is objective in nature, and measurable in practice. Judgments
concerning objective factors might be expected to be relatively
uncontroversial, but even objective factors can be difficult to
measure. This is especially true when parties have incentives not
to accurately report true quantitative values, as we believe will
often be the case in proportionality disputes. In addition, the
enumerated proportionality factors will inevitably involve
unavoidable and practically important normative judgments.
Thus, in discussing the six enumerated factors, we emphasize both
objective measurability and the extent to which normative
judgments are necessary in implementing each factor.
A. FACTORS 1 AND 2: IMPORTANCE OF ISSUES AND THE AMOUNT IN
CONTROVERSY
In many cases-certainly, when money damages are the sole
requested relief-the amount in controversy (factor 2) will be the
most objectively determinable. When the amount in controversy
is, for example, $100,000, is it ever appropriate to approve a
discovery request that will cost even more than that-for example,
$500,000? At first blush, it seems difficult to justify forcing a
defendant to engage in discovery production that costs five times
the amount for which the defendant has been sued. Even so, it is
impossible to answer this question without reference to factor 1,
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"the importance of the issues at stake in the action."5 1 As we have
seen, there may be substantial external benefits to the general
litigation in question; thus, discovery costs that seem exorbitant
when only the instant litigants are considered can, in context, be
justifiable. The Committee Notes to the 2015 Amendment to Rule
26 recognizes this point:
[T]he monetary stakes are only one factor, to be
balanced against other factors. The 1983 Committee
Note recognized "the significance of the substantive
issues, as measured in philosophic, social, or
institutional terms. Thus the rule recognizes that
many cases in public policy spheres, such as
employment practices, free speech, and other matters,
may have importance far beyond the monetary amount
involved." Many other substantive areas also may
involve litigation that seeks relatively small amounts
of money, or no money at all, but that seeks to
vindicate vitally important personal or public values.52
Consider, for example, a hypothetical case in which a plaintiff
alleges a constitutional rights violation, demanding only injunctive
relief. The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."53 Certainly, then,
"the importance of [First Amendment] issues at stake" would
justify requiring the government to spend more than zero dollars
on discovery. But what is the limit on the amount that a proper
proportionality analysis would suggest the government should
have to spend? Recognizing the inherent line-drawing nature of
this challenge underscores the fundamentally normative
judgments that judges will have to make in implementing the
proportionality standard.
51 Id.
52 FED. R. CiV. P. 26, advisory committee's notes, 2015 Amendment; Memorandum from
Judge David G. Campbell, supra note 2, at B-41-B-42.
53 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
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B. FACTORS 3 AND 4: PARTIES' ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND
RESOURCES
A party may have limited or extensive access to information,
but its access is whatever it is; thus factor 3 is objective. That
said, parties may have conflicting ideas about access to
information.54 Measuring access can thus be expected to pose a
substantial challenge for judges in implementing proportionality,
because it might be quite difficult for judges to observe a party's
ease of providing information in discovery.55 Similarly, requesters
will have incentives to minimize their ability to obtain the
information in question on their own, or to overstate their costs of
doing so. Thus, in a proportionality system backstopped by
judicial refereeing, disagreements and posturing concerning the
ease of accessing information are likely sources of litigation.
Factor 4, the parties' resources, is objective, because a party's
resources may be great or slight, but they are what they are. It
might be practically difficult to measure party resources, though.
How should a judge consider the resources of a corporation with
relatively little cash on hand, for instance? Should it matter
whether that corporation has easy access to financial markets?
Whether it is a subsidiary with a cash-rich corporate parent?
Individual litigants' resources could also be difficult to measure in
practice. How should a court regard the resources of individual
litigants with little liquidity but substantial amounts of either
home equity or retirement-fund assets? And what about the
frequently relevant example of an individual litigant who has
limited personal net worth but is represented by a wealthy lawyer
working on contingency?
54 Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell, supra note 2, at B-40 ("A party
requesting discovery... may have little information about the burden or expense of
responding.").
55 Id. (stating that access-related "uncertainties should be addressed and reduced in the
parties' Rule 26(f) conference and in scheduling and pretrial conferences with the court" but




C. FACTOR 5: FORECASTING
Factor 5 calls for judges to make fine-grained forecasts
concerning how as-yet unknown information will affect parties'
chances of winning (whether at trial or beforehand via summary
judgment). Judges conducting factor 5 analysis will encounter
three kinds of challenges.
First, judges will encounter incentive problems in determining
important objective facts known to parties concerning the likely
contents of disputed discovery. Parties sometimes will have a good
idea of how important requested information is to the case.
Smoking-gun inculpatory evidence in a defendant's possession will
obviously wreck its case, for example. But whether judges can
discern the beliefs that parties hold in more marginal cases is
another question.
Second, the parties may be off base in their understanding of
the importance of these facts. The Advisory Committee Note
states that a "party requested to provide discovery may have little
information about the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues as understood by the requesting party."56 For this reason,
the Committee suggests that a "party claiming that a request is
important to resolve the issues should be able to explain the ways
in which the underlying information bears on the issues as that
party understands them."57  Of course, a party requesting
information may believe information is important without having
a good sense of the extent of this importance; indeed, the parties'
informational posture might be just the opposite of that posited by
the Committee. In many cases, then, a responding party claiming
that a request is not important should be able to explain why not.
In sum, factor 5 will require substantial reliance on parties' own
reports concerning the impact of requested information on a case's
merits resolution. Requesters will have strong incentives to
exaggerate the importance of requested discovery. Would-be
responders will have strong incentives to minimize it. And of





disagree strongly enough for each party to believe litigating the
discovery dispute is worthwhile. Judges, who generally won't have
any more information about the case at bar than the least well
informed party, will have to decide which party to believe. And of
course, even a party who is well informed about the content of
requested information might have mistaken beliefs about the
marginal impact of that content on a case's future merits
determination.
Third, judges must make their own assessments concerning the
merits impact of the requested information. Even with accurate
descriptions of the parties' beliefs as to this impact, judges won't
always forecast correctly.
A final point involves timing. When prospective discovery
requests are at issue, a judge paying attention to marginal costs
should ignore whatever has already been spent on earlier
discovery. Consequently, parties who will do most of the
responding in cases in which the discovery burden is asymmetric
58
can be expected to press the issue of proportionality early in
discovery. This observation might affect the informational base
that judges have in deciding proportionality disputes.59 That is, in
a system with regular litigation of proportionality disputes, parties
might change their behavior so that judges are called on to
58 The Advisory Committee Note considers such cases especially important for
proportionality purposes. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's notes, 2015
Amendment; Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell, supra note 2, at B-40 ("One
party - often an individual plaintiff- may have very little discoverable information. The
other party may have vast amounts of information, including information that can be
readily retrieved and information that is more difficult to retrieve. In practice these
circumstances often mean that the burden of responding to discovery lies heavier on the
party who has more information, and properly so.").
59 One commenter on the 2015 amendments suggests this timing point is one of special
concern. See Letter from Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Prof. for the Admin. of Justice,
Univ. Pa. Law Sch., to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (February 10, 2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesandPolicies/rules/2010%20report.pdf (suggesting that
the burden of establishing proportionality will, as a de facto matter, fall on those seeking
discovery, and stating that the incidence of proportionality and/or burdensomeness disputes
will be "exacerbated" because when proportionality is part of the scope of discovery, the judge




adjudicate such disputes earlier than current practice would
otherwise lead us to expect.60
D. FACTOR 6: BALANCING COSTS AND BENEFITS
Factor 6 is where the proportionality standard's rubber meets
the road: it asks judges to conduct a cost-benefit analysis in
determining "whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit." The first five factors can be
viewed as the "inputs" in this determination, so it will be useful to
understand how factors 1-5 function in relation to the balancing
contemplated by factor 6.
One position a judge could conceivably take is that disputed
discovery will not be allowed in a damages-only action if the cost of
providing the requested information exceeds the total amount in
controversy. This approach would require the judge to measure
the marginal cost of discovery. That implicates only factor 3, since
a responding party's ease of access to information determines the
costs of providing that information,61 as well as factor 2 (the
amount in controversy). Such an approach involves a strong
normative component. Consider a plaintiff who will surely win a
lawsuit if $2 million is spent on discovery. If the suit is for $1
million in damages, the judge who adopts this approach will refuse
discovery. That will prevent a plaintiff with a meritorious suit
from obtaining redress to which she is entitled, in the name of
saving the defendant a greater amount. This is a fundamentally
distributional-and hence normative-choice.
60 For more on the important role of timing in discovery, see generally Scott A- Moss,
Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal But Could Be Better: The Economics Of Improving
Discovery Timing In A Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889 (2009); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989) (noting that high information costs are
likely to make any such judicial regulation "hollow").
61 Note, though, that factor 3 also might speak to marginal benefits. In situations where
the requesting party could access the requested information on its own, one benefit of
allowing requested information is that the requester needn't spend its own resources
acquiring the same information. A judge who believes the requester will spend its own
resources obtaining the information in question, if the discovery is disallowed, should
recognize that only the distribution, and not the level, of expenditures on discovery would be
affected by refusing the discovery request.
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Another approach would be for the judge in a damages-only
action to refuse a disputed discovery request whenever the cost of
the requested information exceeds the marginal effect of the
discovery on the expected damage amount. This approach also
takes into account factors 2 and 3, while also taking into account
factor 5, which concerns the impact of requested information on
the forecast probability that the plaintiff will win. Like the first
approach to balancing, this approach has a fundamentally
normative component.
62
Several of the proportionality factors allow judges to soften the
force of normative rules as blunt as the two just discussed. Most
notably, as we discussed supra in reference to factor 1, the
Committee Notes emphasize that monetary stakes must "be
balanced against other factors," taking into account that "many
cases in public policy spheres, such as employment practices, free
speech, and other matters, may have importance far beyond the
monetary amount involved."63  Factor 4, the parties' resources,
presumably also allows equitable balancing: presumably a judge
balancing all factors would hesitate before requiring a resource-
poor party to spend a large share of its resources obtaining
discovery that its wealthier adversary could provide at little or
modest relative cost.64
As this discussion illustrates, implementing the proportionality
standard will in many cases require quantifying benefits
implicated by intrinsically nonquantifiable factors. Cass Sunstein
has argued that such difficulties can sometimes be usefully
addressed via "breakeyen analysis."65 In the present context, that
62 See the example in Part IV.C.
63 FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's notes, 2015 Amendment; Memorandum from
Judge David G. Campbell, supra note 2, at B-41-B-42 (quotation marks omitted).
64 Even so, the Committee has emphasized that there are limits on such equitable
considerations. See Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell, supra note 2, at B-42
(stating that "consideration of the parties' resources does not foreclose discovery requests
addressed to an impecunious party, nor justify unlimited discovery requests addressed to a
wealthy party").
65 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(Harvard Law Sch. Pub. L. & Leg. Theory, Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 14-13, 2014), http://
ssrn.com/abstract-2424878. But see Daniel A. Farber, Breaking Bad? The Uneasy Case for
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would mean asking how large the nonquantifiable benefits of
litigation would have to be to justify allowing particular discovery
requests. If intuition suggests the required benefits are very likely
above or below the breakeven level, then the course of action is
easy to determine. It is important to recognize that even when a
breakeven analysis is practical to carry out, different judges will
have different normative intuitions concerning nonquantifiable
benefits of litigation.
In sum, the proportionality standard written into Rule 26(b)(1)
functionally provides judges with equitable discretion to consider
normative issues. The standard therefore will carry the same
advantages and limitations of any other balancing test.
6 6 It will
allow judges to take note of case-specific issues that implicate
justice, speed, and expense. It will also involve subjectivity and a
reduction of predictability.67
Regulatory Breakeven Analysis (Apr. 28, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract-24 30263 (responding
to Sunstein and arguing against the general use of breakeven analysis).
66 While cost-benefit analysis is controversial in some quarters, it is widely viewed as a
useful conceptual framework to design rules or regulations. However, it is also widely
recognized that the practical usefulness of implementing a particular cost-benefit analysis
will be context dependent. See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, Challenges for Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S63 (2014) ('The devil is in the details - what
benefits, what costs? How are they measured?").
67 This is hardly the only place in procedural law where a cost-benefit analysis is written
into the Rules, of course. For example, Fed R. Evid. 403 states that:
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.
However, the generalized cost-benefit standard contained in Fed. R. Evid. 403 is supplemented
in Fed. R. Evid. Art. IV by specific rules of admissibility that are "concrete applications evolved
for particular situations" that reflect the policies underlying Fed. R. Evid. 403. FED. R. EVID.
403, advisory committee's notes, 1972 Proposed Rules. Thus, direct application of Fed. R.
Evid. 403 is limited to "situations for which no specific rules have been formulated." Id. No
such supporting rules yet exist to guide application of the generalized cost-benefit test
contained in the proportionality standard. See, e.g., Ctr. for Judicial Stud., Duke Law Sch.,
Discovery Proportionality Guidelines and Practices, 99 JUDICATURE 47, 47 (2015) (discussing
concerns about the ambiguity of certain factors enumerated in the proportionally standard
and suggesting guidelines for applying the standard).
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VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Our mission in this paper has been to discuss key economic
aspects of beefing up the proportionality standard in discovery.
We have seen that the externalization of both costs and benefits
plays a central role in our discovery system. We have also seen
that agency problems are endemic to discovery in an adversarial
system. Because our focus has been on the Advisory Committee's
chosen course, we have not discussed more fundamental changes
to the American discovery system.68 Instead, we have focused on
assessing the six factors around which the proportionality
standard will revolve.
Greater reliance on a judicially managed proportionality
standard will involve a number of challenges. Will parties have
the proper incentives to report the information that judges need to
carry out a proportionality analysis? Will the parties even have
that information at the time that the standard will be applied?
How will judges determine the implicit weight to place on
nonquantifiable factors involving the importance of nonmonetary
issues in a case? How good a job will judges do forecasting the
merits value of the (yet-to-be-provided) requested information in
question? Whatever the answers to these questions, we can expect
For example, some authors suggest that a better system would require requesting
parties to internalize the costs of their requests directly, through a default rule requiring
that requesters pay; see, e.g., Redish & McNamara, supra note 28, at 778 (discussing costs
as a litigation subsidy); Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix,
51 DUKE L.J. 561, 608 (2001); ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 217-19 (Foundation Press 2003); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 435 (1994);
Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 638. This approach is currently used in exceptional cases,
e.g., the expert deposition cost allocation rule under FRCP 26(b)(4)(C)(i), as well as the 2015
amendment to Rule 26(c)(1)(B), which would allow courts, "for good cause," to "specify[]
terms,... including.., the allocation of expenses, for the" requested discovery. See
Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell, supra note 2, at B-33-B-34 (discussing what
courts will allow). Other approaches would focus on minimizing cross-party agency costs by
making the requesting party responsible for carrying out and bearing the costs of the
search. See Kobayashi, supra note 28, at 1477 (addressing cross-party agency costs). Still
another alternative relies even more heavily on judicial management than does
proportionality; see Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 882-94
(2015) (discussing possible implementation the British approach to litigation budgeting in
American courts).
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an increase in the variation in adjudication due to the
discretionary factors written into the proportionality standard.
In pointing out these challenges, we do not mean either to
praise or to criticize the re-emphasized proportionality standard.
Our goal has been to elaborate, from an analytical perspective, the
economic considerations that arise from the standard as written.
We hope that this discussion will facilitate the future of both
judicial management of proportionality and litigation more
generally.
